Spying on anti-war protestors: US Army Concept of Operations for Police Intelligence Operations, 4 Mar 2009
May 5, 2009
Summary
The document presents a 60 page For Official Use Only intelligence manual from the US Army's Military Police School. Among other matters, the document reveals that the US Army is using structuring tricks to work around intelligence oversight rules that would normally prevent domestic spying and hoarding of data on anti-war protesters (bolding by WikiLeaks):
- A CONUS [CONtinental UNited States] based PIO [military Police Intelligence Operations] network that is integrated with local, county, regional, state and federal, law enforcement entities will ensure a federated approach to enable a unified effort for defense support to civil authorities...[including] data exchange...[and the] production of [travel] blacklists...
- An [intelligence] fusion cell located within the garrison staff provides a unique service that can address the complexities of the threat to a military community and installation and be an asset to the garrison and local civilian community. It has the ability to work closely with multiple local, federal, and DoD agencies. It does not have constraints that are emplaced on MI [Military Intelligence] activities within the US, because it operates under the auspice and oversight of the police discipline and standards. At the garrison level, the fusion cell is static (non‐deploying) which provides a level of continuity that allows for in‐depth institutional knowledge of threat, physical and social environs, as well as long‐term relationships with local and federal law enforcement agencies. A garrison fusion cell can also be a flexible analytical cell that can grow to form focused, ad hoc, threat‐specific cells to address, prevent or react to a specific hazard.
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- Vignette: A Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) was preparing to move equipment to a port of embarkation (POE) for deployment. The shipment required the movement of 300 vehicles across eight law enforcement jurisdictions. Based on previous threat fusion expertise, the garrison's force protection (FP) fusion cell was uniquely qualified to be the lead intelligence producer to support the movement. The fusion cell coordinated police information, intelligence and civilian security with over 22 local, federal, and DoD agencies. The fusion cell produced in‐depth analysis of the threat to the SBCT equipment and advised the SBCT and garrison commanders on protection. The coordinated effort gave law enforcement agencies the knowledge to identify and prevent disruptive actions by violent protesters. The operation was considered by Corps leadership to be a watershed event for in‐depth involvement of a garrison‐based FP fusion cell in support of unit deployments. Moreover, the Corps headquarters integrated the fusion cell into other operations where the G2 is constrained by intelligence oversight rules, or there is a need for police information / intelligence assessments and analysis. A fusion cell is valuable when separate data streams, information sources, or other disparate information from multiple organizations must be combined and analyzed in a coherent process to present a common operational picture for a decision maker.
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