Stop! Please. Get beneath the hype over former White House press secretary  Scott McClellan's book, What  Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington's Culture of  Deception. Don't miss the forest for the trees.
 Not since John Dean told the truth about President Richard Nixon's crimes  have we had an account by a very close aide to a sitting president charging him  with crimes of the most serious kind.
 McClellan writes that George W. Bush abandoned "candor and honesty" to wage a  "political campaign" that led the nation into an "unnecessary war."
 The chief U.S. prosecutor of senior Nazi officials at the post-World War II  Nuremberg Trials, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, labeled such  action – more correctly termed a war of aggression – the "supreme international  crime."
 In other words, President Bush used propaganda and deception to lead the  United States into what an earlier generation of American leaders judged not  just a war crime, but the "supreme" war crime.
 And, in all this, Bush had an eager cast aiding and abetting – from  careerists in the U.S. intelligence community to the fawning corporate media  (FCM) whom McClellan referred to as "deferential, complicit enablers."
 As for the role of intelligence, McClellan tells of "shading the truth." In  the effort to convince the world that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction,  the president used "innuendo and implication" and intentional ignoring of  intelligence to the contrary.
 Water over the dam, you say? No way.
 White House spinners are at it again – "fixing" the intelligence around the  policy, this time on Iran. The fixing is obvious, but don't expect to hear about  it from the FCM.
 An exception is MSNBC's Keith Olbermann. His antiquated approach is to ask  relevant questions – like, for example, will the White House do an encore in  preparing us for an attack on Iran?
 Interviewing McClellan Thursday evening, Olbermann earmarked time to discuss  Iran and asked, "So knowing what you know, if [White House spokeswoman] Dana  Perino starts making noises similar to what you heard from Ari Fleischer in 2002  … would you be suspicious?"
 "I would be," McClellan said.
 Wait. Before taking this with a blasé shrug, consider the source.
 Fixing In Fits and Starts
 The worst-kept secret in Washington is that Bush and Vice President Dick  Cheney are looking for a pretext to order air and missile attacks on Iran. But  when and how will Dana Perino and the rest of the propaganda machine market this  one?
 When to sell? If former White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card's dictum  regarding "marketing" the war on Iraq holds sway – i.e., "From a marketing point  of view, you don't introduce new products in August" – the administration has  only two months, unless it opts for an "October Surprise" as a more effective  way to help achieve a Republican victory in November.
 But a smooth rolling out of war on Iran has proven more troublesome – no  thanks, by the way, to the FCM, most of them still claiming they did just fine  before the war on Iraq.
 Part of the problem has been the new marketers. With Andy Card, Karl Rove,  Dan Bartlett, and Tony Snow gone, it is amateur hour for White House spinners as  they start-stop and rotate rationales for striking Iran.
 And how to sell? Less than a year ago the focus was twofold:
 (1) What President Bush on Aug. 28 called "Tehran's murderous activities"  against our troops, including "240-millimeter rockets that have been  manufactured in Iran and that had been provided to Iraqi extremist groups by  Iranian agents;" and
 (2) His ad-lib on Oct. 17: "We've got a leader in Iran who has announced he  wants to destroy Israel. … I take the threat of a nuclear Iran very  seriously."
 Oops…
 But where are those 240-millimeter rocket shells? For some reason, Gen. David  Petraeus cannot deliver the goods.
 As recently as April 25, his nominal boss, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Adm.  Mike Mullen, invited the press to what was supposed to be a well-oiled  show-and-tell exercise "in a couple of weeks," to display a multitude of  captured weapons from Iran.
 But the show did not go on; it had to be canceled when the weapons that had  been found proved not to be of Iranian origin.
 Ironically, one major hurdle would be getting senior Iraqi officials to go  along with a hyped-up demonstration of weaponry from Iran.
 Shortly after Mullen offered his invitation, the Iraqis announced that Prime  Minister Nouri al-Maliki had formed his own Cabinet committee to investigate  U.S. claims about Iranian weapons, and to attempt to "find tangible information  and not information based on speculation."
 The other pretext is the hyped-up danger from Iran's nuclear program.
 Here, the administration suffered acute embarrassment when a vestigial group  of honest intelligence analysts and supervisors had the temerity to serve up an  un-fixed intelligence National Intelligence Estimate last fall that showed that  Bush had been knowingly exaggerating the nuclear threat from Iran.
 The declassified key findings of the NIE were released on Dec. 3. They  included:
 "We judge with high confidence that in the fall of 2003, Tehran halted its  nuclear weapons program; we also assess with moderate to high confidence that  Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons." "We assess with moderate confidence Tehran has not restarted its nuclear  weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends  to develop nuclear weapons." "Tehran's decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less  determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our  assessment that the program probably was halted primarily in response to  international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the  issue than we judged previously." To Bush and Cheney's dismay, the findings had been shared with Congress and  could not be suppressed.
 What followed was the ineffably inept performance one has come to expect from  National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, who claimed the Estimate "confirms we  were right to be worried about Iran seeking to develop nuclear weapons [which]  remains a very serious problem."
 And before leaving for his early January 2008 trip to the Middle East, the  president said part of his purpose was to make it "abundantly clear … that we  view Iran as a threat, and that the NIE in no way lessens that threat, but in  fact clarifies the threat."
 Got that? Threat.
 According to Newsweek's well-connected reporter Michael Hirsh, Bush  all but disowned the NIE in conversations with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud  Olmert.
 According to a senior U.S. official accompanying the president, Bush told the  Israelis that he couldn't control what the intelligence community says, but that  the Estimate's key judgments do not reflect his own views.
 Bush reportedly had briefed Olmert in November on the Estimate's findings,  and he seemed almost apologetic about the findings.
 After Bush departed Israel in January, a Newsweek reporter asked  Olmert if he felt reassured, to which Olmert replied, "I am very happy."
 A Flexible Director of National Intelligence 
 Malleable Mike McConnell showed his true colors shortly after the president  got back from Israel.
 Unable to withstand withering criticism from the likes of former Secretary of  State Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and the  irrepressible former U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Bolton, McConnell  backpedaled.
 In testimony to the Senate on Feb. 5 he confessed to careless wording in the  NIE due to time constraints, and even indicated he "probably would have changed  a thing or two."
 He would now say, for example, that "maybe even the least significant portion  [of the Iranian nuclear program] was halted and there are other parts that  continue."
 Next at bat was the president himself in an interview on March 19 with the  U.S.-government-run Radio Farda broadcasting to Iran in Farsi.
 Bush asserted that Iran has "declared it wants a nuclear weapon to destroy  people" and that it could be hiding a secret program. A White House cleanup team  conceded that Bush's statement about what Iran has "declared" was  inaccurate.
 It was Defense Secretary Robert Gates' turn in April. Speaking at West Point,  Gates said he believes Iran is "hell bent" on acquiring nuclear weapons. (Does  it strike anyone that abandoning their weapons program in 2003 seems a strange  way of going about it?)
 Gates added that he favored keeping the military option against Iran on the  table.
 The NY Times Jumps In 
 And on May 27, the New York Times misquoted one of the key judgments  of the NIE. More than a subtle distinction, the Times indicated that  the Estimate stated, "It was uncertain whether the weapons work had  resumed."
 Speaking to the pro-Israel Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP)  two days later, McConnell's deputy, Donald Kerr, took the same line, emphasizing  that "since the halted activities were part of an unannounced secret program  Iran attempted to hide, we do not know if it has been restarted."  (Emphasis in original)
 This is the spin that the president, senior officials – and the New York  Times – have been putting on the NIE.
 As noted above, the relevant NIE key judgment reads: "We assess with moderate  confidence Tehran has not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of  mid-2007…"
 (Incidentally, that Kerr, as deputy to McConnell, would give a major address  to WINEP moves the intelligence community much too close to a partisanship with  this group, at least for this veteran intelligence officer's taste. Martin  Indyk, erstwhile research director of the American Israel Public Affairs  Committee, America's self-described "pro-Israel lobby," founded the institute.  AIPAC is listed as its parent organization.)
 Rather than shadowboxing, making confessions when it seems opportune, and  introducing subtle changes of emphasis aimed at making the Estimate's judgments  more politically palatable, McConnell and Kerr should do their duty.
 And that is to follow the long established intelligence community procedure  for updating an important NIE by ordering preparation of what is called a  "Memorandum to Holders" – in this case, holders of last fall's NIE on Iran.
 This is an orderly, time-tested way to get the 16 U.S. intelligence agencies  that prepared the NIE on Iran to revisit it in a deliberate and rigorous way and  to indicate what, if anything, they believe needs to be changed.
 At the release of the unclassified version of the NIE on Iran on Dec. 3,  2007, Kerr issued a written statement explaining why the key judgments were  being made public.
 "Since our understanding of Iran's capabilities has changed, we felt it was  important to release this information to ensure that an accurate presentation is  available," he said.
 Exactly right. So if the NIE's judgments are being challenged and/or are in  need of update, let Kerr or McConnell give the task to the dedicated  professionals responsible for drafting the NIE late last year.
 And if McConnell should decide – or be told by the White House – not to, the  congressional oversight committees should awake from their stupor and require a  Memorandum for Holders.
 It is certainly their prerogative, their duty, to do so.
 Someone apparently needs to tell Director McConnell that it is not required  that the Israelis – or Kissinger, or Schlesinger, or Bolton – agree with the  Estimate's conclusions, however much the president would like all to be in sync  with the preferred line.
 And, given the stakes, the new findings should not be rushed or done on the  cheap.
 Learning Curve Still Steep 
 McConnell (and Kerr, for that matter) are still new to substantive  intelligence analysis, and McConnell has admitted having difficulty with the  rigorous demands of the job. Frankly, I find it unsettling that one of them  briefs the president six mornings a week.
 McConnell's lack of experience on issues other than technical intelligence  collection showed through in an especially troubling way on Feb. 27, 2007, as he  briefed the Senate Armed Services Committee.
 Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) asked McConnell why the Israelis sometimes have  a different view on Iran's nuclear program.
 McConnell appeared quite puzzled, noting the closeness of the U.S.-Israeli  intelligence relationship and how U.S. intelligence officers discussed these  things with the Israelis. As I watched, I could not help feeling sorry for the  director of national intelligence – and for the rest of us, as well.
 A pity that his predecessor, the more seasoned John Negroponte, did not take  time to tell McConnell what he told NPR's Robert Siegel before  Negroponte quit to go back to the State Department.
 Asked by Siegel to explain why the Israelis have suggested a much shorter  timeline for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon, Negroponte stated the obvious  with bluntness uncommon for a diplomat: "I think that sometimes what the  Israelis will do [is] give you the worst-case assessment."
 Really!
 ~ Source: CASMII  (Campaign against sanctions and military intervention in Iran) ~