The war that wasn't: NATO versus Warsaw Pact

From Obroda :

It never happened of course. But what if NATO and Warsaw Pact would collide? Read the comments of few experts.

Questions:

1. In the case of the conventional warfare between NATO and WAPA (or if you like with Soviet bloc armies as WAPA was created in 1955) who would be the winner and why? Does the outcome differ if we look at the various time periods 50's, 60' etc… and how would you describe the strongest and weakest points on both sides?

2. Is it possible to say where would be the main battlefield in the case of the conventional war?

3. NATO was created as the alliance based on the collective defense. Was there during the Cold War any serious discussion in the alliance about the preventive strike against the Eastern countries? If yes (probably it was more about the possibility of nuclear strike) what was the trigger for such discussion?

4. NATO was also involved in the “stay-behind” operations as for example Operation Gladio to counter possible Soviet invasion. Would you say those activities were useful or mainly they were toys of intelligence agencies?

Answers:

Lawrence Kaplan, Adjunct Professor of History at Georgetown University and Director Emeritus of the Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO and European Union Studies at Kent State University

1. While the Soviets had the advantage of superior ground forces in the 1950's, they were offset by US superiority in nuclear power until the very end of the decade. In the sixties there was a stand-off as both the US and USSR recognized the dangers of mutual destructions. Note Cuban missile crisis, Soviet retreat over Berlin, and a US diverted by Vietnam in the 1960's

2. Main battlefield in 1950's and 60's expected to be Germany, although the Italian military was convinced that the Gorizia gap was as vulnerable as the Fulda gap.

3. I have never found evidence of a preventive strike plans. The McNamara strategy was to have sufficient strength to survive a Soviet ICBM first strike to strike back effectively. Presumably this would inhibit the Soviets.

4. The Gladio scandal in Italy in the 1990's set in motion the notion of a massive conspiracy by Western intelligence agencies working with neofascist groups to take over resistance after Soviet occupation. Swiss historian Daniel Gansler develops this thesis. I found too many holes in it. I like your phrase, "tools of intelligence agencies." I suspect the subject was widely discussed but not acted on. Brussels Norwegian historian Olav Riste did call its absence from the archives a "black hole".

David Isby, political and defense analyst, autor of many books and articles on military and security

1. This, of course, would never have been known. Conventional war was really not feasible until the soviet policy changes post-1967. In the 1979's and 1980's, the Soviet investments in theater forces under Brezhnev – the cause of much of their economic disaster – was aimed to give them a capability to fight and win before the nuclear threshold was reached. While, in the 1980's, the US and to lesser extent Germany and other members improved their conventional capabilities, it was only with Gorbachev that the threat began to fade.

2. The plan was that the battle would be fought near the inner German border. To the extent that the Warsaw Pact could have penetrated and fought a large-scale battle of maneuver further to the west – reminiscent of the great battles of the eastern front of 1943-45 – it would have been an advantage for the Soviets.

3. The Soviets became increasingly concerned with the preemption after the 1967 Middle East war. As a result, NATO became concerned with not taking steps that the Soviets would misinterpret as the preemptive strike. That is one reason why NATO never moved to battle positions along the inner German border.

4. If they could have worked and it there was an outside help – which the Polish civil war of 1944-49 lacked – yes it could have been effective. The Afghans were effective against the Soviets.

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