Warfare By Other MeansTurkey has sharpened its anti-PKK political offensive, to include increased "information focus" on the sources of PKK finances. Fundraising by Kurdish "front organizations" in Europe is a major source of PKK cash; the Turkish government has been pressing central and western European countries to shutdown the "fronts" operating in their territory. Turkey has especially put pressure on its NATO allies. The other big source of PKK money is the drug business. Yes, the PKK is involved in drug smuggling. This is old news but the kind of news that often gets little media coverage. Turkey has started pointing out that the PKK began smuggling opium in 1982, moving some of its "product" through PKK-controlled camps in Lebanon. The PKK has also provided a "connection to Europe" for the Afghanistan-Iran and Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran opium and heroin trade routes.
About 30 % of production and smuggling of drugs in the territory of Central Asia and Russia consists of narcotics of Tajikistan origin. If an annual turnover of the Afghani heroin in 2006 made 4.5-5 billion US dollar, the volume of the narcotic market in Tajikistan has reached around $1.5 billion. Today it has already made equal 60-70 % of the volume of Gross National Product of Tajikistan.
Tajikistan has strongly won a reputation as one of the world's key transit states in the international illegal traffic of drugs. In a considerable degree it was promoted by heavy economic situation in Tajikistan after civil war, slackening system of the state control, the followed crash of the economy, sudden growth of unemployment, and also by the greater extent of border with Afghanistan (1344 km), providing the increased narcostream from this country. In many cases, because of these circumstances the number of drug addicts and concomitant illnesses was sharply increased in Tajikistan (including HIV/AIDS).
Reflections of Fidel
The Chinese Victory (Part I)
Direct trade between Europe and China began in the sixteenth century, after the Portuguese established the commercial enclave in Goa in India and in Macao in southern China.
Spanish control in the Philippines facilitated an accelerated exchange with the great Asian country. The Qin dynasty, which ruled China, tried to limit this kind of unfavorable commercial operation with foreign countries as much as possible. It was allowed only through the port of Canton, today called Guangzhou. Britain and Spain had great deficits because of the low demand of the enormous Asiatic country, related to English goods manufactured in the metropolis, or Spanish products coming from the New World that were not essential to China. Both of them had begun to sell opium.
Large-scale opium trade was at first dominated by the Dutch through Jakarta, Indonesia. The English observed the profits that were close to 400 percent. Their opium exports which, in 1730, were 15 tons, grew to 75 in 1773, shipped in crates weighing 70 kilograms each; with this they bought porcelain, silk, spices and Chinese tea. Opium, not gold, was the currency Europe used to acquire Chinese goods.
In the spring of 1830, faced with the unbridled abuse of the opium trade in China, Emperor Daoguang ordered Lin Hse Tsu, an imperial official, to fight the plague; he ordered the destruction of 20,000 crates of opium. Lin Hse Tsu sent a letter to Queen Victoria asking for respect for international regulations and not to allow trade with toxic drugs.
The Opium Wars were the English response. The first lasted three years, from 1839 to 1842. The second, with France joining in, lasted four years, from 1856 to 1860. They are also known as the Anglo-Chinese Wars.
The United Kingdom forced China to sign unfair treaties committing this country to opening up several ports to foreign trade and handing over Hong Kong. Several countries, following England's lead, imposed unequal terms of exchange.
Such humiliation contributed to the Taiping Rebellion of 1850 to 1864, the Boxer Rebellion of 1899 to 1901 and, finally, the fall of the Qin Dynasty in 1911 which, for various reasons including its weakness in the face of foreign powers had become highly unpopular in China.
What to say of a memoir of failures? I give Hafvenstein tremendous credit for being honest about his qualifications for the job he undertook (none), the preparation his company had made to ensure its success (none), the care USAID took to make sure its projects were useful in any way (none) and the ultimate result of several months in the sticks of Helmand running an Alternative Livelihood program (little). None of this is his faultafter all, he was the optimistic kid jumping at the chance to do a job in a dangerous, high-profile area: how many of us would have taken the exact same opportunity? This memoir is more the story of how truly screwed up the international community in Afghanistan is than anything specific about the "year" (it was really more like six months) he spent on the "frontier."
Probably the most interesting portion of the beginning passages of the book, aside from the sinking feeling that accompanies the "I was clueless but willing, so they sent me" meme, is Hafvenstein's discussion of how USAID and their contractors operate. It is a realm measured not by sustainable development projects, but by how much money gets churned through these companies. The project he is to lead in Lashkar Gah is not meant to be a sustainable development program, but merely a crash course in flooding the local markets with cash in the hopes that it is enough to keep people out of the poppy fields long enough for the eradication teams to bulldoze them out of existence. Buried into this, and it is not unique to his company Chemonics by any stretch, is the silly arrogance of all-purpose consulting firms. Chemonics can throw together a proposal to: "clean up air pollution in Cairo, train Russian judges, help Ugandans export cut flowers," and so on, all on a few hours' notice. The defense industry is much the same way: companies bid on so many things they couldn't possibly be qualified for, merely because they have the resources to hire (one hopes) the right people for the job.
The result, as one would expect, is that these development projects come into being with no real purpose. While describing how their naοve-but-hopeful project to re-engineer southern Afghanistan's social and economic networks on a shoestring budget slowly unraveled, Hafvenstein writes a surprisingly readable summary of Afghanistan's history, going through the American presence in Helmand in the 1960's (which directly led, if Roseann Klass' account is accurate, to the ending of Purdah under Daoud) back to the ancient kingdom of Ghazni that was sacked by Genghiz Khan (and led to the creation of the kaleidoscopic pastiche of ethnicities and languages in modern-day Nuristan).
But the fundamental conceit of their project was just thata conceit. While admitting focusing on poppy missed the point, Hafvenstein also reveals the curious mindset of the professional development workers: they treat their jobs as little more than adventure tourism, and many seem not to care about the peculiarities of the cultures where they work, but merely whether or not they keep USAID happy enough to send the next check.
Poppy farmers in Afghanistan are being compelled to give away their daughters to local drug traffickers after failing to clear their loans.
According to a report appearing in the Newsweek magazine, these farmers have been involved in this business for decades on the stony hillsides of eastern Afghanistan and in the dusty southern plains.
Taking the example of Sayed Shah, the magazine says he borrowed 2,000 dollars from a local trafficker, promising to repay the loan with 24 kilos of opium at harvest time. But just before the harvest, the government destroyed Shah's entire two and a half acres of poppy.
Unable to pay off his debt, Shah fled with his family, but was found by the trafficker. Village elders then unanimously ruled that Shah would have to reimburse the trafficker by giving Khalida, his ten-year old daughter in marriage.
This system of "loan brides", is cruel, but the magazine says that for the farmers, it os a way out of their back-breaking debt.
Many people still mistakenly believe the Taliban were opposed to the drug trade due to the ban they placed on opium cultivation during their last year in power. However, even prior to capturing Kabul on Sept. 27, 1996, the Taliban made deals to allow opium cultivation and processing in return for political support and a cut of the profits.
[ ... ]
The United States Drug Enforcement Administration said the ban was probably an attempt to increase the price of opium, which declined following a series of bumper crops. The Taliban also hoped to gain international recognition of their government beyond Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Before the Taliban banned cultivation in 2000, the farm-gate price for dry opium was $30 to $100 per kg. The ban caused a surge in opium prices that topped at $700 per kg in September 2001, about a year after the ban was enacted. This created a windfall of millions of dollars in additional profits for the Taliban and their associates who had been strategically stockpiling up to 60 percent of the opium crop for several years prior to the ban.
The price of opium plummeted during the U.S. attack on the Taliban which began Oct. 7, 2001. Wholesalers dumped their stock, flooding the markets in Afghanistan and Pakistan and driving down prices of opium to approximately $100 per kg. Afghan traffickers said they were concerned about their opium being destroyed by American bombs. Opium prices recovered by December 2001, climbed significantly during 2003 and 2004, and have recently softened again due to bumper crops in 2006 and 2007. The average price in Afghanistan for 1kg of dry opium was $106 in January 2008.
Both before and after the U.S. invasion, the Taliban made their money by levying taxes of 10 percent on opium cultivation and up to 15 percent to 20 percent on processing, trade, smuggling, and distribution. These taxes were in addition to other financial agreements they made with regional and international drug traffickers to provide protection for opium fields, heroin processing labs, drug shipments, and narcotics smugglers. In many cases, taxes were paid to the Taliban in drugs, which the Taliban sold or stored for future sales.
The Taliban taxes on cultivation and processing are based upon the Islamic charity taxes of "zakat" and "usher." Zakat, also referred to as alms or purification, is the third of the Five Pillars of Islam. It requires individuals to share 2.5 percent of their wealth with those in need. Usher literally means "tenth," and refers to the tax paid on the harvest for the benefit of the poor.
'Afyon' a historic island in a sea of steppe If the name is brought up in conversation with other foreigners it invariably elicits little response beyond "oh, isn't that the place where they grow all the opium?" (The answer is "yes" by the way, afyon is actually the Turkish word for opium). But this pretty provincial town holds an important place in the heart of every Turk. For at nearby Dumlupınar, on Aug. 26, 1922, Mustafa Kemal Atatόrk led the nationalist forces to victory in what turned out to be the last major battle of the War of Independence. The invading Greek army, routed, fled in disarray to the coast. In October the last Greek troops left what would become, in a little over a year, the soil of the newly formed Turkish Republic. Atatόrk had planned for the victory at Dumlupınar in Afyon's town hall. This building is now the Zafer Mόzesi (Victory Museum) and houses photographs, weaponry and other relics from the famous battle.
[ ... ]
There are a number of worthwhile places to see and things to do in the surrounding countryside. Around Ihsaniye, some 30 kilometers north of Afyon, are stretches of bizarrely eroded landscape reminiscent of Cappadocia. Stands of poplar, interspersed with fields of silky leaved opium poppies and spindly yellow sunflowers, provide a stunning foreground for the pinnacles and cones of wind scoured rock. The Phrygians were top dogs in this region in the sixth century B.C. and they left behind numerous traces of their passing. Near the modern village of Ayazin a large rock outcrop is studded with a series of cave dwellings and tombs, some decorated with lion reliefs. A few kilometers to the north the village of Kaya is the rock-cut tomb known as Arslantaş (the Lion Stone). The entrance to the burial chamber is flanked by two snarling lions. En route to the village of Doğer is another important Phrygian site, Arslankaya (the Lion Rock). Here a relief carving of the Anatolian earth goddess Cybele is guarded by -- you guessed it -- another pair of fearsome lions.
Important: Do NeoCons, CIA Want Bush Assassinated to Stay in Power, Invade Pakistan? It is in the interest of the neocons and their moles in the US intelligence community not to let peace prevail in the region or even to apprehend Osama. Why? Not only does his being at large provides the American troops a ready excuse to stay there while protecting the interests of the multinationals there but it offers tremendous opportunity to bank on the widespread fear among the American public. But if peace talks are allowed in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan, Kabul will be compelled to do the same in Afghanistan. It must be pointed out that while many think that the economic interests of the occupying forces are limited only to the civilized economic projects in the country, the most important factor of interest remains the poppy cultivation resulting in widespread opium trade. There of course are reasons why after the invasion the cultivation has increased many folds instead of decreasing under the watchful eyes of the US and the NATO soldiers. A relative peace would ensure increased UN activism in the country and hence decline in the poppy production. That is exactly why an infuriating use of force is so essential.
Before I move any further let me quote a few paragraphs from the UNODC's Afghanistan Opium Survey (August) 2007 to make my point. "In 2007, Afghanistan cultivated 193,000 hectares of opium poppies, an increase of 17 percent over last year. The amount of Afghan land used for opium is now larger than the corresponding total for coca cultivation in Latin America (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia combined).
"Favorable weather conditions produced opium yields (42.5 kg per hectare) higher than last year (37.0 kg/ha). As a result, in 2007 Afghanistan produced an extraordinary 8,200 tons of opium (34 percent more than in 2006), becoming practically the exclusive supplier of the world's deadliest drug (93 percent of the global opiates market).
"Leaving aside 19th century China, that had a population at that time 15 times larger than today's Afghanistan, no other country in the world has ever produced narcotics on such a deadly scale." 50 percent of the country's crop is produced in the Helmand province which incidentally is the place with highest British troops presence. While the province with 2.5 percent population has a presence of over 5000 British soldiers, ironically the production of opium has increased three times since the occupation of the country. Unfortunately while no one among the occupation forces in Afghanistan may accept it, but if use of force was the only option, total destruction of the poppy crops was never such a difficult problem.
May I also point out here that not only is the UK, Washington's only ally that has always stayed the course, the rise of the people with shady background to the top of the US intelligence community during a neocon rule also explains quite a lot. John Negroponte is remembered by many as the butcher of Honduras. But when he was the Director of National Intelligence, his deputy was also somehow connected to a scandal which spreads from Honduras to the Iran Contra Scandal in 1980s. When General Hayden the former head of the NSA and Deputy Director National Intelligence was nominated for the post of the Director of the CIA a senior office bearer of the agency Kyle Dustin "Dusty" Foggo was forced to step down.
His stated reason for resigning was that a new director should be able to choose his own deputies. However Foggo was charged on February 13, 2007 with fraud and other offenses in the bribery case of convicted US congressman Randy Cunningham. This indictment was superseded and expanded with an indictment returned on May 10, 2007, charging fraud, conspiracy, and money laundering in relation to his dealings with defense contractor Brent Wilkes. Incidentally when Hayden was the director of National Security Agency he hired the services of a Lt. Gen. James C. King an employee of MZM, one of the companies at the heart of the Cunningham scandal. King worked for the then NSA director at the same floor as his and his work was widely unknown even inside the agency. He is known to have also indulged in the same bizarre bribing activities. Another key figure in the scandal is businessman Brent Wilkes who worked in Honduras during the 1980's for a company accused by federal prosecutors of deep involvement in cocaine trafficking. That company was also deeply embroiled in the Iran Contra Scandal.
Unfortunately during those days a similar problem linked to money laundering and drug trafficking arose in Pakistan when the Bank of Credit and Commerce International was seized on the same charges. The bank was alleged to have been involved in money laundering of the narco-trade related fortunes earned by many including some Pakistani military officers during the Soviet Afghan war. Since Hayden assumed the charge of Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council immediately after culmination of the Contra Affair where he stayed till July 1991 and in 1992 President Bush Senior pardoned many of the central characters, he is supposed to have taken active part in the cover up of the entire sordid episode. If he is party today to any similar guns and drugs project he and Negroponte certainly do get to gain a lot from the instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And Musharraf has also been mentored by those involved in the Afghan Soviet war and the BCCI episode he naturally emerges as a classic ally of these folks. This is exactly why Hayden rushed to Pakistan after Benazir Bhutto's assassination to testify that it were indeed the Taliban who had perpetrated the crime, upon flimsy proof and despite the Taliban's repeated denial. Likewise immediately after the election of Pakistan's new Prime Minister, Negroponte rushed to Pakistan for arm twisting and coercing the new leadership to adopt a conciliatory stance towards Musharraf.
Poppy fields found in the Algerian Sahara Algerian national police discovered 25 poppy plantations on Tuesday (April 1st) while conducting their biggest-ever operation against opium and hashish farms in the Saharan wilaya of Adrar. Some 58,780 opium shrubs (used as the raw material for morphine and heroin), 6,020 hemp plants and 15 kg of opium seeds were destroyed and five people were arrested during the raid 124 km west of Timimoune, El Khabar reported. According to the paper, the quantity of drugs is equal to 83% of all narcotics seized in 2007, indicating that poppy cultivation is hitting an alarming level.
National Office against Drugs and Drug Addiction (ONLDT) Director Abdelmalek Sayeh described this new phenomenon as "worrying" in a statement yesterday to the APS press agency, although he was keen to say that for now it was still "limited" in size.
He noted that the total area of the poppy and cannabis plantations discovered is still modest: only between four and five hectares. "Algeria is not a growing country" for drugs, he said.
Monday's find may be troublesome, Sayeh conceded, but he noted that according to the United Nations, it is worse elsewhere in the Maghreb. Algeria's "crops are not as widespread as in Morocco, where the assigned acreage is up to 125,000 hectares," APS quoted him as saying.
Taleban seeking missiles to attack Nato helicopters TALEBAN warlords are using cash from Afghanistan's bumper opium poppy crop to try to buy shoulder-launched ground-to-air missiles, the country's anti- narcotics tsar has warned.
The surface-to-air missiles played a key role in driving out Soviet troops in the 1980s because they let mujahideen fighters shoot down Russian helicopters. Military commanders fear that such attacks could paralyse current Nato operations.
Afghanistan's counter-narcotics minister, General Khodaidad, said the Taleban was busily scouring illegal arms markets for better anti-aircraft weapons.
Nirvanistan: She's On The Main Line India is a fast emerging transit nation for cocaine, heroin too The equations have changed in the drug trade vis-a-vis India. In the past, local consumption of heroin was considered a major problem, but the new assessment is that consumption of the drug is far below international levels. But a report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime notes India is now emerging as a transit country for cocaine and heroin.
The fallout of this trend is a cause of some concern for the Narcotics Control Bureau. Officials say South American cocaine is now trafficked to India, to be exchanged for cheap Afghan-origin heroin bound for Europe or North America. Thus, if the quantum of heroin coming into India goes up, it naturally has an impact on the inflow of cocaine, which is much in demand in the party circuit in Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore and Goa.
POLITICS, SCIENCE & HYSTERIA RESURGENCE 2
Several decades of aggressive law-enforcement against narcotic drugs, military operations in Afghanistan, Colombia, Peru and elsewhere have failed to stem the flow.
Where the UN drug authorities have claimed a 'success story' ... Big reductions in opium cultivation in Burma and Laos upon closer inspection it turns out to be a misleading claim. In Laos opium has been replaced in many places by a far worse drug known as 'ya ba' [Amphetamines].
In the junta-ruled Burma [Myanmar] much is made of the drastic opium reduction in the northern Wa state but again there has been no cutbacks in 'ya ba' pills that are manufactured in batches of a million at a time flooding SE Asia and beyond.
The failure of orthodox drug enforcement strategies in so many countries has not worked. In the US zero tolerance has filled the jails but the drug mafias continue to prosper. In Thailand under former PM Thaksin Shinawatra his declaration of police quotas led to a shoot the suspects policy with corpses piling up and few questions asked.
The long history of failure of all-out narcotics repression has sadly not led to any substantial debate over policy and strategy.
TNI-[The Transnational Institute ] that closely monitors narcotics agencies commented on the UNODC 2006 report:
"The report suffers from the tension between UNODC policy makers who want a strict control regime maintained and who are under huge US funding pressure and the experts willing to open an honest debate about the effectiveness of outdated aspects of the current policy framework." .
Other UN agencies have regular evaluations of their operations but the UNODC-[formerly the UNDCP it is now called the UN Office for Drugs and Crime] never seems to feel the need for any debate over its effectiveness and seldom responds to any criticism. The same applies to its sister agency the INCB International Narcotics Control Board-both based in Vienna.
TNI and other critics argue that these two UN agencies are too much obsessed with a US agenda ' the war on drugs' too the detriments of other issues. The eradication of narcotic crops also affects economic livelihood, the use of coca plant and opium as proven medicinal treatments and other development issues.
It is fairly obvious that the global drugs problem is a complex subject Involving health problems, need for treatment of drug addicts, impact on communities and society, and the need for a sustainable solutions.
The knee-jerk response of politicians to round up a few suspected traffickers and shoot them as with Thaksin's ' war on drugs' in Thailand, only leads to a lot of corpses and highly-publicised body-counts. When the police are encouraged to shoot on sight, this is a breakdown in the rule of law and the promotion of a police state, where the citizens live in daily fear of trigger-happy cops.
That the UNODC never criticised former PM Thaksin's bloody war on drugs, prompted another UN agency UN Human Rights in Geneva to prod their sister agency UNODC in Bangkok, to distance themselves from the killings on the street.