Parent Licensing by Pierre Lemieux

In the Winter 1980 issue of Philosophy and Public Affairs, Hugh LaFollette, a philosophy professor at East Tennessee State University, published an article arguing for the need to license parents.[1] The argument is quite straightforward. "We," or "our society," understandably require licensing for automobile operators, physicians, lawyers, pharmacists, psychologists, and psychiatrists, all activities that require a certain competence and are "potentially harmful to others." The two criteria of potential harm and ascertainable competence apply even more to parenting, which is "an activity potentially very harmful to children." Therefore, would-be parents should be forced to demonstrate their competence, obtain a license, and perhaps be trained, before rearing their children, for the same reasons that we strictly regulate the adoption process. "Undoubtedly," LaFollette writes, "one should be wary of unnecessary government intervention in individuals' lives. In this case, though, the intrusion would not often be substantial, and when it is, it would be warranted."

Since it was originally published, this paradigmatic article has been reproduced in more than a dozen books of public policy, ethical philosophy, and "environmental ethics." The proposal has gained disciples in other countries, and these are often more radical than LaFollette himself, who thought that alternative systems could perhaps protect children adequately. "For example," he wrote, "a system of tax incentives for licensed parents, and protective services scrutiny of nonlicensed parents, might adequately protect children." Two Canadian public health specialists argue that "[n]o one should be allowed to raise children until they have finished high school, completed a parenting course, and obtained a licence."[2] A famous British surgeon, Sir Roy Calne, argues that people should have to pass a parenting test and obtain a reproduction license before being allowed to have children.[3]

Note how narrow a conception of rights underlies Prof. LaFollette's argument. Prior restraint of the kind involved in licensing is justified "if the restriction is not terribly onerous and the restricted activity is one which could lead easily to serious harm." In this perspective, only a limited number of real rights exist: rights of free speech (which, coincidentally, apply mainly to intellectuals like LaFollette), religious rights, right to vote, and rights of association. Presumably, individuals will associate to talk and worship, for what else is there to do? Even the enumerated rights can be limited to protect third parties. And "rights" to engage in hazardous activities, like parenting, are conditional on meeting minimal standards. Determination of the nature of harm and the cost of restraint, and definition of real and conditional rights, presumably belong to "society."

Also underlying the proposed scheme is an underestimation of the efficiency of free human interactions, combined with an overblown confidence in political and bureaucratic processes. Statists tend to compare imperfect markets with perfect government. In this perspective, LaFollette would certainly agree with the World Bank researchers who recently wrote: "A priori, parents would ideally always be willing and able to protect children from tobacco themselves. If this happened, there would be little need for government to duplicate such efforts ... Perfect parents, however, are rare."[4]

LaFollette would probably add, in his usual cool way, that the parent licensing system will not be perfect, but just less imperfect than the harmful system of totally private parenting that we now have. This completely neglects the effect of the proposed system on the growth of state power. It is recommended not to laugh at slippery slope arguments when you are actually speeding on a very slippery one.

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