Greek-Turkish relations have long been dominated by divergent views on power and its use in inter-state relations. This stems from contending approaches to conflict management and resolution but also from incompatible motives in using it.
Ever since 1999 a "new" mood on both sides has changed expectations, but this proved to be on the surface, at least as far as the one side is concerned. The logic of mutual understanding and bargaining with a view to resolving pending issues has dic-tated an actual policy change in Athens. The new Greek foreign policy inaugurated after 1996 was a major deviation from the policy lines built in the previous decades.
First, it centered around Turkey´s EU membership, a task of great, non-calculated risk for the sustainment of the EU itself, its cohesion and its Europeanist dream. Greek objections had all these years been used as an alibi by those who did not wish to see Turkey in the EU. Actually this was one of the reasons the French political elite ap-peared fragmented prior to the 2005 referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. One of the leading proponents of non-membership was ex-French Prime Minister Laurent Fabius who explicitly articulated his views in a book published in 2004 providing a clear causational pattern. [1]
Second, despite negative predisposition across European capitals [2] Greece became a stern supporter of Turkish membership hoping that the values and European ideals that have cemented Europe and turned it into a zone of peace and stability could spread in Turkey. Actually this change of policy created friction between opposing groups of Greek politicians and academics who supported alternative strategies.
The most critical views were formulated on the logic that Greece was giving too much to a country that constitutes the only long term military threat to the country. They claimed that "opening" the door to a neighbor who has diachronically questioned the territorial status quo actually voided the very raison d´ être of Greek foreign policy and constituted a diplomatic blunder formulated under an idealistic and naïve concep-tual framework. The evaluation was made on the axiom according to which a state´s national policy is the actual externalization of a state´s priorities and the expression of national interest.
Still Athens went on supporting Turkish EU membership despite the multilevel chal-lenges this potential membership constituted for the EU itself [3] and the casus belli expressed by Turkey, should Greece exercise its legal right to expand it territorial sea borders.
Conventional wisdom supported by historical evidence and codification of crises pa-rameters analyzes the motives of the two countries through a Realist – Idealist divide reflecting contending values and motives, namely a revisionist and a status quo coun-try. In Greece polemical views against Turkish EU membership have been built on the externalization of a militaristic bravado expressed by a certain milieu in Ankara, while the rise in power of T. Erdogan was evaluated as a positive and promising sign.
In essence Greek expectations were rather far-fetched and beyond the accommodating capacity of the Turkish political-military establishment. A slight change in communi-cation strategies was not enough to alter long established views, even stereotypes in Greek public opinion and above all the perception of threat.
The ontological question made by a number of academics and policy analysts in Greece related to the extent to which such policy U-turn could affect the fundamentals of our neighbors´ policy lines and their views and attitudes on exercising foreign pol-icy. The international behavior of a state can not change overnight, particularly when it is built in a way that supports the catalytic role of a certain milieu that has long op-erated as the eminence grise of the Turkish political scene. To some circles in Ankara Greece is a very convenient "threat", a "foe" by destiny, a threat that justifies their role and ability to overlay demands for a more egalitarian economic and social policy. Actually this noble cause is one of the reasons that brought Tahip Erdogan to power.
Yet, the problem is not related just to a structural struggle between elites and their dominant role. It is far deeper and it is based, above all, on ideological grounds and the concept of using military power as a sole instrument of exercising foreign policy. This constitutes a stark deviation from EU ideals, values and norms. The EU zone of peace has not been built on coercion but consensus. It was a matter of deliberate elite choice and institutional accommodation of existing and acknowledged differences [4]. Ex-German Chancellor H. Kohl rightly defined European integration as a matter of choice between peace and war.
The utility of military power and its being the basic, if not only, component of inter-acting with the international milieu is what differentiates the two countries. I will give an indicative example of that. It is one of the reactions to one my last articles on Greek-Turkish relations. It exposes the logic behind policy choices and conceptualiza-tion of power.
"A country's Foreign Policies must be compatible with its economic as well as mili-tary capabilities! Otherwise the result is disappointing and painful… in fact Turkish Parliament passed the famous Casus-Belli Bill, which is hanging there like Damocles' sword! If Greece is really interested in a mutually acceptable solution to the poten-tially dangerous situation in the Aegean, it should stop hiding behind big brothers such as the USA or EU, and negotiate directly with its big neighbour".[5]
Such logic would certainly shock Luxembourgian politicians, as the prospect of this small country being crashed by German multidimensional might would be imminent. Yet, this is not the operating norm of the EU, a fact that pinpoints the huge value and conceptual gap between Brussels and Ankara.
The above depicts the Realist epitome of a particular strategy and state ideology. It is the difference between macho politics and a normative, regulatory approach to inter-national politics as propagated and institutionally supported by a soft power like the EU. Eventually Turkish policy justifies those who oppose current Greek mood vis-à-vis Turkey and seriously question the overall gains of a drastic change of policy.
Third parties fail to see that bilateral relations should be built on an equilibrium, as far as bargaining is concerned. In the summer of 2005 US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Daniel Fried delivered a speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on behalf of Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns. He remarked that "Turkey has made great strides in developing close, cooperative relations with most of its neighbors, as we have seen in a steady drop of tensions in the Aegean and strong Greek support for Turkey's EU membership".[6]
The statement portrays the final aim not the actual reality. Tensions still exist and they did not come out of the blue. Greek revised policy has not been fully, if at all, appre-ciated. On the contrary is has been interpreted as a sign of weakness a fact that needs to be taken into consideration by Athens. In a world of sovereign states and anarchy self-help provides the only reliable line of defence.
The Turkish political and military elites cannot see the real dangers both countries face. The ghost of recession and poverty is lurking at our backyard undermining the very quality of the Greek and Turkish peoples´ lives. Yet, some circles either treat this real not potential threat as a technicality or ignore it just to justify their position in power. In any case they do not serve their people´s livelihood.
1] See Laurent Fabius, Une Certaine Idée de l´ Europe, Plon, Paris, 2004
2] 35% of the right and left wing party supporters were against potential accession of Turkey to the EU. See Le Monde, 17-6-2005. In a survey conducted by Le Figaro 67% of the participants were against Turkish EU accession, while 55% of Germans adopted a similar view. See "Schroeder reaffirms his stance on Turkey", International Herald Tribune, 14-12-2004.
3] For a full analysis see George Voskopoulos, Greek Foreign Policy, from the 20th to the 21st Century, Papazisis pubs, Athens, 2005.
4] See George Voskopoulos, The Construction of Europe, peace, reconciliation, co-operation, integration, Poiotita pubs, Athens, 2008.
5] The identity and status of the sender as well as the forum it represents is at the dis-posal of the site coordinator and editor.
6] See "The U.S.-Turkish Relationship beyond Iraq: Common Values, Common Agenda", Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 18, 2005
~ From: American Chronicle ~
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