Tuesday, April 29, 2008

'Twenty-five years after Reagan's Star Wars speech' - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Twenty-five years after Reagan's Star Wars speech

On March 23, 1983, President Ronald Reagan made his famous Star Wars speech, announcing his plan to develop a missile defense system that would make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." His vision of a "shield that could protect us from nuclear missiles just as a roof protects a family from the rain" was both seductive and audacious.

It was seductive because it offered an easy answer to the omnipresent threat of a massive Soviet nuclear attack at a time when the Soviets and the United States maintained 60,000 nuclear warheads between them. It especially appealed to those who believed in the supremacy of U.S. science and technology but did not understand technical issues.

At the same time, Reagan's speech was audacious because it flew in the face of all that the United States had come to understand about missile defenses over the previous 30 years. The Pentagon had been working on defenses against ballistic missiles since the 1950s--almost as long as it had been working on ballistic missiles. By 1972, both Washington and Moscow concluded that offense had significant inherent advantages over defense and that an effective defensive system wasn't feasible. They also believed that building defenses could lead to an arms race by inducing each country to build more missiles to overwhelm the other's defenses. Thus, under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, both nations gave up the possibility of defending against each other's nuclear-armed missiles.

Twenty-five years later, antimissile technology has come a long way. Guidance and homing have improved so much that all current U.S. missile defense systems use hit-to-kill technology intended to destroy the incoming target by ramming into it. Previous defenses against long-range missiles were designed to use nuclear-tipped interceptors to destroy a warhead at a distance.

In recent years, the United States has also built and fielded a significant amount of hardware as part of its ground-based missile defense system, including 24 silo-based interceptors in Alaska and California and a new sea-based X-band radar in the Pacific Ocean. It has also upgraded the Cobra Dane radar in Alaska and two early-warning radars--in California and Britain--and fielded a transportable X-band radar in Japan.

Meanwhile, the rationale has changed--and is less daunting. Defending against a few potential North Korean or Iranian long-range missiles is far less demanding than defending against thousands of incoming Soviet missiles.

Regardless, Reagan's dream of building a viable defense against long-range missiles is still simply that--a dream. And by pursuing this dream, the United States has weakened its own security instead of enhancing it.

The real legacy of Reagan's dream

Let's take a clear-eyed look at what 25 years have brought us: First, the Pentagon has yet to demonstrate that the U.S. ground-based missile defense system is capable of defending against a long-range ballistic missile in a real-world situation. The tests have demonstrated that the kill vehicle is able to home in on and collide with an identifiable target, but under highly scripted conditions. A February 2008 Government Accountability Office report, "Assessment of DOD Efforts to Enhance Missile Defense Capabilities and Oversight" PDF concluded that these tests have been "developmental in nature, and do not provide sufficient realism" to assess the system's potential effectiveness.

To permit deployment of the fledgling ground-based missile defense system, the Pentagon exempted it from the normal accounting and testing procedures that apply to all other weapons systems. For example, the system does not comply with so-called "fly before you buy" laws, which are designed to prevent the military from purchasing weapons that are unsuitable for their real-world mission or don't work as intended. Under these laws a major defense program may not produce more than a small number of weapons--generally for testing purposes--until the Pentagon's director of operational testing and evaluation issues a report stating whether the testing and evaluation was adequate and whether the results show that the weapon system is effective and suitable for combat. That won't be possible until the Pentagon conducts realistic tests, a prospect that may never occur.

To circumvent the rules, the Missile Defense Agency refers to the ground-based missile defense components as fielded rather than deployed and has claimed that they're test assets used as part of the test program.

Second, there's almost no prospect that the United States will develop a defense system that could defend against real-world long-range missiles in the foreseeable future. As a 2000 Union of Concerned Scientists/MIT technical report, "Countermeasures," concluded, any country with the capability and motivation to build long-range missiles and fire them at the United States also would have the capability and motivation to equip those missiles with effective countermeasures such as decoys.

Third, as long as the United States and Russia continue to maintain nuclear weapons to deter each other, any U.S. steps to deploy a defense system that Russia believes could intercept a significant number of its survivable long-range missile forces will undermine efforts to reduce nuclear threats. This link between offensive weapons and missile defenses was clearly demonstrated in the 1986 Reykjavik summit meeting, when Reagan's adherence to missile defense scuttled an opportunity to pursue Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's offer to negotiate deep cuts in nuclear stockpiles. Ironically, missile defense precluded taking a real step toward achieving Reagan's goal of rendering nuclear weapons obsolete.

U.S. missile defenses are an obstacle to real security

Today, the risk of a premeditated Russian or Chinese nuclear attack on the United States is essentially zero. But because Russia continues to maintain more than 1,000 nuclear weapons on high alert (as does the United States), ready to be launched within minutes, there's still a danger of an accidental or unauthorized attack or of a mistaken launch in response to a false warning. Indeed, such attacks are the only military threats that could destroy the United States as a functioning society.

Russia's incentive to maintain its weapons on alert would be strengthened if it believed that the United States was deploying a system that could threaten its ability to retaliate. In fact, when the United States tried to renegotiate the terms of the ABM Treaty in the late 1990s, it argued that Russia need not fear a U.S. defense system as long as it kept its missiles on high alert. Doing so would allow Russia, on warning of a U.S. first strike, to quickly launch a retaliatory attack large enough to overwhelm the defense.

Meanwhile, China has a small arsenal of roughly 20 long-range missiles that it relies on for deterrence. However, it could decide to offset U.S. defense deployments by increasing its arsenal, which could prompt India and then Pakistan to increase their nuclear arsenals.

On one level, the United States is aware of this linkage. It has stressed that its ground-based missile defense system is intended to protect against potential threats from developing countries and has stated that deployments would be "limited" so that Russia and China wouldn't see them as a threat to their nuclear deterrents. But from Russia's and China's perspective, the issue is whether U.S. actions match its words.

In the coming years, the United States plans to increase the number of interceptors that are capable--at least in principle--of defending against long-range missiles. Congress has allocated funds for 40 ground-based missile defense interceptors to be deployed in Alaska and California. The United States is negotiating with Poland and the Czech Republic to deploy an additional 10 ground-based missile defense interceptors and one or two radars in Europe near the Russian border. Russia has strongly objected to this plan.

Within five years, the United States is also slated to deploy some 150 interceptor missiles on 18 ships as part of its Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System. While these interceptors are designed to defend against intermediate-range ballistic missiles, the United States plans to produce an upgraded version of the interceptor to allow the Aegis system to defend against long-range missiles as well. This could cause Russia and China to worry that they could soon face some 200 U.S. interceptors designed to destroy long-range missiles.

Compared with China's 20 long-range nuclear-armed missiles, 200 interceptors constitute a relatively large deployment. While Russia has a far larger arsenal, it may assume that most of it would be destroyed by a U.S. first strike. While the scientists in these countries may understand that these interceptors can be defeated by straightforward countermeasures, their political and military leaders, motivated by worst-case analyses and the desire for a response that is visible to its public and the United States, may build or retain larger nuclear forces than they would otherwise consider necessary, and in the Russian case may keep their missiles on high alert.

The real legacy of Reagan's Star Wars speech is that missile defense has become a high-profile, politically symbolic program, rather than a military program judged on its merits. The continued political support for a program that still offers no prospect of defending the United States from a real-world missile attack and undermines efforts to eliminate the real nuclear threats to the United States shows that Reagan's vision remains seductive--dangerously so.

David Wright

A physicist, Wright codirects the Union of Concerned Scientists' (UCS) Global Security Program. His expertise is in national missile defense, space weapons, and U.S. nuclear weapons policy. As a primary organizer of the International Summer Symposiums on Science and World Affairs, he helps create an international community of scientists working on arms control and security issues. He has also worked for many years on projects that train technical arms control experts in other countries, especially Russia and China. In 2001, the American Physical Society awarded him with the Joseph A. Burton Forum Award for his arms control research and work with international scientists.

Lisbeth Gronlund

A physicist, Gronlund codirects the Union of Concerned Scientists' (UCS) Global Security Program, where she is also a senior scientist. Her expertise is in missile defense, arms control, and U.S. nuclear weapons policy. She has testified before Congress on missile defense and coauthored the 2005 report "The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual" and the April 2000 study "Countermeasures." In addition to her position at UCS, she is a research affiliate in the Program on Science, Technology, and Society at MIT.


Republicans, missile defense, and the Reagan legacy

When developing a weapons program for the Defense Department, there is normally an orderly and somewhat rational process to be followed: First, a threat is identified; research is then conducted on how best to deal with said threat; and finally, a weapon system is developed and eventually produced.

If at any time in this process the threat changes or the research demonstrates that no available technology exists to deal with the threat, or a weapon system cannot be developed in a cost-effective manner, the research is stopped, slowed down, or canceled.

There is no doubt that sometimes bias, organizational culture, or ideology becomes a part of the process. Threats can be hyped, research and development skewed, and the capabilities of a new weapons system exaggerated. But rarely does this process become completely irrational. It is possible to have a reasonable, rational debate about whether the United States should purchase the F-22 fighter aircraft, the DDG-1000 destroyer, or V-22 helicopter.

But this is not the case with national missile defense, which owes its origin to President Ronald Reagan's 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative speech challenging the country to develop a defense system that would provide the United States with the ability to destroy any and all nuclear-equipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) launched against Washington by the former Soviet Union. Reagan believed that a successful missile defense could both end the nuclear arms race and make nuclear weapons obsolete. He even went so far as to promise to share the technology with the Soviets. In what would be a harbinger of things to come, Reagan did not consult with either the military or Defense's civilian leadership before unveiling his proposal.

In the 25 years since Reagan's speech, the United States has spent hundreds of billions of dollars on missile defense, the Soviet Union has collapsed, and the national missile defense system has not undergone a realistic test. Yet, ground-based national missile defense systems have been deployed, most Republicans argue that it should be the Pentagon's top priority, and the Bush administration continues to pour tens of billions of dollars into missile defense each year. National missile defense is the only weapons system mentioned in the last three Republican presidential platforms and the Contract with America, the Republican manifesto that led to the party assuming control of Congress in 1994. Why?

For starters, it has become a litmus test of loyalty to the Reagan legacy. President Reagan has assumed the same iconic place for Republicans that Franklin Delano Roosevelt had for so many years for Democrats. For example, John McCain, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, often refers to himself as a foot soldier in the Reagan Revolution, as did his former opponents Mitt Romney and Rudolph Giuliani. This revolution was based on three pillars--pro-life as opposed to pro-choice; government as the cause of society's problems as opposed to the solution; and a robust national missile defense as opposed to arms control negotiations or disarmament.

Some Republicans have difficulty completely supporting the first two pillars: The majority of Americans want to place only a few restrictions on a woman's right to choose and view government as a solution to many of our economic and social problems. But there is no political downside for a Republican to embrace missile defense. Most Americans either believe we already have a missile defense capability or really do not care much about it now that the Cold War has ended. National missile defense may be mentioned in the Contract with America or the Republican platform, but nobody reads these documents, let alone votes based on their contents.

In addition, a foolproof national missile defense would enable Republicans to go it alone in the world and not have to rely on other nations or international treaties to provide security. This philosophy can be summed up as "unilateral if we can, multilateral if we must." Thus, if national missile defense can protect the United States against North Korean, Iranian, or Chinese missiles, why negotiate or make concessions? Or if the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia prevents Washington from forging ahead with national missile defense, why not just scrap the treaty regardless of how it affects U.S.-Russian relations? Or why ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty? Instead, move ahead with the development of the bunker-buster or the reliable replacement warhead.

Consequently, when the Republicans are in power, they push missile defense relentlessly. After the Republicans won both the Senate and House of Representatives in 1995, they passed a law, the National Missile Defense Act, which said that it was U.S. policy to deploy national missile defense as soon as possible. Never mind that the Soviet Union had collapsed, that the Clinton administration had just concluded an agreement with North Korea to freeze its development of plutonium at Yongbyon, or that there was no evidence then that Iran was violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Similarly, when President George W. Bush took office, he immediately doubled missile defense spending, gave notice that Washington would withdraw from the ABM Treaty, and cut off negotiations with North Korea. Moreover, since he was not sure he would be reelected in 2004, he accelerated the deployment of ground-based missiles in California and Alaska even though the system had failed virtually all of its tests up to then.

Bush's obsession with missile defense continues today. At the recent NATO summit, the president made deployment of radars and ground-based missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic his first priority. For him, it was more important than getting NATO to provide more troops to the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan or improving relations with Russia.

Richard Garwin, a distinguished physicist who helped develop the hydrogen bomb and served on the Rumsfeld Commission that Congress established in 1996 to analyze the ICBM threat, put it well when he said, "The strongest proponents of national missile defense have no technical understanding at all." Another scientist, Philip Coyle, the Pentagon's director of operational test and evaluation from 1994 to 2001, noted that it is not in the cards to ever have a Plexiglas dome over the United States in which enemy missiles will be like hail bouncing off of a windshield. Yet, many Republicans believe that this can and will be done and continue to make national missile defense the largest single investment program in the Defense Department--i.e., $13.2 billion for missile defense in 2009. Sen. Joseph Biden, a Democrat from Delaware, summed it up best when he commented on the National Missile Defense Act in 1999: "Perhaps the real clash here is between ideology and reality."

Lawrence J. Korb

A senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, Korb served as assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration from 1981-1985. In that position, he administered 70 percent of the country's defense budget; his service earned him the Defense Department's medal for Distinguished Public Service. He has written 20 books on national security issues, including The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon, Future Visions for U.S. Defense Policy, and A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction. He is currently a member of the Bulletin's Science and Security Board.


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